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THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT IN PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION
Existing federal legislation offers significant flexibility in determining the
tax consequence of partnership transactions.' In providing this freedom
Congress recognized that the tax benefits to one partner often produce
adverse consequences to the others. 2 Bargaining among the partners and
subsequent embodiment of the bargain in a partnership agreement was considered a better adjustment of prospective tax liabilities than that achieved
by inflexible Internal Revenue Code provisions.
Five Code sections permit a specific partnership agreement to determine
tax consequences. Section 704 (a) allows the partnership agreement to fix
partners' profit and loss ratios. Section 704 (b) expands this privilege by
allowing the partnership agreement to allocate different items of profit and
loss in different ratios. Under section 704 (c)(2) the partnership agreement
can alter the allocation rule applicable to contributed partnership property.
Alteration is similarly permitted by section 704(c)(3) when undivided interests in property are contributed to a partnership. Finally, section 736 (b)(2) (B) allows goodwill to be included in a partner's capital interest if the
partnership agreement so provides.
Although not specifically provided in the Code, the partnership agreement
can also determine tax consequences in two other areas. The agreement may
characterize the withdrawal of a partner from a partnership either as a sale
of his interest to the remaining partners or as a liquidation of his interest by
the partnership,4 and it may establish the deductibility of payments to a
partner for services or the use of capital.5
The purpose of this note is to detail the utility of the partnership agreement in each of these seven situations.6
1. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1954). Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 a partnership includes a broader class of business operations than under the
common law meaning of "partnership." For tax purposes a partnership includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated association through or by means
of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not a
corporation, trust, or estate. INT. REv. COnE OF 1954 §761 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
See generally A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §1.01, at 3-4 (1971). For a discussion of
the characteristics determining an association as a partnership rather than as a corporation see Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2 (1960).
2. David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 551 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
3. Id.
4. E.g., Bolling v. Patterson, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1464 (D. Ala. 1961); Miller v.
United States, 331 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Andrew 0. Stilwell, 46 T.C. 247 (1966); David
A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535 (1964), afJ'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
5. E.g., Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d
717 (2d Cir. 1964); F. A. Falconer, 40 T.C. 1011 (1963).
6. A discussion of the complete tax relevance of the partnership agreement is beyond
the scope of this note. The note is limited to the situations where the partnership agreement can directly determine tax consequences. Its indirect importance, for example, in
defining each partner's interest in capital and profits is omitted even though such measurement is crucial in planning and decisionmaking. See generally A. WILLIS, supra note 1,
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Requirements for Integration of Agreements
Under the Code a partnership agreement includes the original agreement
and all valid modifications. 7 Two conditions are required to validate a modification in a particular taxable year. A modification must be in existence on
the date the partnership tax return is due for the year in issue.8 It must also
be agreed to by all the partners or adopted in a manner provided in the
existing valid agreement.9
Existence of the Agreement
Since the burden of proving the existence of any agreement lies with the
taxpayer,10 a written agreement or modification is advantageous. This is
especially true for modifications of a prior written agreement, since evidence
of a subsequent oral modification is often insufficient to prove alteration of
that agreement.
In Dewey D. RingeI,11 for example, the taxpayer was given a seventy-five
per cent interest in a two-man partnership under the terms of a written
agreement. The taxpayer contended, however, that his interest was only fifty
per cent, and to prove this contention he introduced evidence of a liquidation
of the partnership on a fifty per cent basis. This evidence that the written
agreement was not followed was not persuasive.1 2 Nonetheless, where the
evidence is persuasive an oral modification will supersede the written agreement. In Melancthon S. Somerse3 this burden of persuasion was met by the
mere credibility of one partner's testimony that an oral modification existed.-4
Proving that an oral agreement has modified a contemporaneously executed
written agreement is more difficult, since the parol evidence rule must be
overcome. 5 If the written agreement were intended to resolve all issues, an
§§4.01-.03, at 25-32.
7. CODE §761 (c). "[A] partnership agreement includes any modifications of the partnership agreement made prior to, or at, the time prescribed by law for the filing of the
partnership return for the taxable year (not including extensions) which are agreed to by
all the partners, or which are adopted in such other manner as may be provided by the
partnership agreement." Id.
8.

Id.

9. Id.
10. E.g., Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621, 1629-30 (1970); Hyman Smith, P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 62,294 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964).
11. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 61,163 (1961).
12. Id. at 896.
13. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 55,199 (1955).
14. Id. at 665.
15. "Where two parties have entered into a contract and have expressed it in a
writing which they intend as the final and complete statement or integration of that contract, no evidence, oral or written, of prior understandings or negotiations, is admissible
to contradict or vary the written contract." L. SIMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS §98, at 195 (2d
ed. 1965).
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oral agreement cannot alter it. 16 However, in Hyman Smith 7 a written agreement that was silent on the allocation of profits did not destroy the legal
effect of an oral agreement establishing such an allocation. Since the written
agreement was not complete, the parol evidence rule was not a bar. 8 An
express provision that the written agreement is complete can thus determine
the applicability of the parol evidence rule.' 9
Proper Adoption of the Agreement
Once the existence of an agreement is determined, it must further be
established that this agreement was approved by all the partners or adopted
pursuant to another method outlined in the agreement itself.20 In most instances a signed written agreement will meet this requirement.21 Where the
written agreement is not signed, however, convincing evidence is necessary,
22
even if no partner objects.
In Jean V. Kresser23 a governing board of partners approved a reallocation of income and provided a period of time in which the other partners
could indicate their disapproval. Since the partnership's affairs were conducted loosely and no convincing evidence was presented to prove actual
notification of the other partners, the court held that complete agreement was
not established. 24 An alternative assertion of proper adoption by the board
was also rejected by the court, since there was no evidence of the board's
2 5
authority under an oral partnership agreement.
Unintended Modifications
Where the existence and proper adoption of a modification are proved,
any resulting tax consequences take effect regardless of whether the partners
26
intended such changes.
In Hellman v. United States27 two agreements were simultaneously executed, one fixing the taxpayer's share of partnership income and the other
assigning most of this share to the other partners. The other partners treated
the assignment as a collateral agreement that did not affect the taxpayer's

16.

Estate of William Goldstein, 29 T.C. 931, 939 (1958).

17. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,294 (1962), afi'd, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964).
18. Id. at 1739.
19. See generally L. SIMPSON, supra note 15, §§98-101, at 195-208.
20.

CODE

§761 (c).

21. E.g., Town & Country Plymouth, Inc. v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
5823 (C.D. Cal. 1967); David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 554 (1964), afJ'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d
Cir. 1965).
22. Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.c. 1621, 1629-30 (1970).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1629.
25. Id. at 1630.
26. The modification will not be followed, however, if adopted principally for a
tax avoidance purpose. See text accompanying notes 41-90 infra.
27. 44 F.2d 83 (Ct. Cl. 1930).
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share of the income for tax purposes. Disagreeing with this interpretation,
the court held the assignment to be a modification of the partnership agreement, since it actually adjusted the income share among the partners. 2 The
court noted, however, that an assignment to non-partners would not have
29
been a modification.
THE

BAsic

ROLE OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

The DistributiveShare
Since a partnership is not a taxable entity,30 its income must be allocated
among the partners so that each partner can include his share in his individual
return. Thus, the determination of each partner's share is basic to the taxation of partners. Section 704 (a) of the Code, rather than making such a
determination, permits the partners to do so by a provision in their partnership agreement. The provision establishing the distributive share for each
partner will be accepted by the Internal Revenue Service unless its principal
purpose is tax evasion or avoidance. 3' Furthermore, all items of income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit need not be shared in the same proportion. General
profits and losses may be shared in one way, while specific gains or losses in
32
another.
Such flexibility is significant, since the distributive share can be established after the income is known. 33 This is possible because the partnership
agreement may be modified at any time prior to the filing of the partnership
tax return. 4 Since a modification relates back to the beginning of the taxable
year, 5 the newly-established distributive shares apply to the entire year's
income. This retroactive effect, however, can be specifically negated in the
partnership agreement. 36
Conclusiveness of the PartnershipAgreement as to DistributiveShare
Each partner's share, determined in accordance with the agreement as
modified, must be reported in the partnership tax return. This procedure has
presented the problem of whether the individual shares as shown in the
partnership return are conclusive as to the amount of the share. Although the

28. Id. at 90.
29. Id. (dictum).
30.

CoDE §701.

CODE §704(b). See text accompanying notes 41-98 infra.
32. CODE §704(b).
33. But see text accompanying notes 78-83 infra.
34. CODE §761 (c).
35. E.g., Jean V. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621, 1628 (1970); David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535,
554 (1964), afJ'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965); Hyman Smith, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,294
(1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964).
36. Town & Country Plymouth, Inc. v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5823 (C.D.
Cal. 1967).
31.
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Internal Revenue Service has contended that taxation was determined from
37
the shares as shown in the tax return, the courts have established the partner38
ship agreement as conclusive.
In Clement A. Griscom

111,

3

9

for example, the tax return gave the tax-

payer a twenty-two per cent share of partnership losses. After an audit by the
Internal Revenue Service established a partnership profit, the taxpayer
claimed that his share was actually five per cent as established in the partnership agreement. Rejecting the Service's contention that the taxpayer was
bound by his twenty-two per cent claim, the court followed the partnership
40
agreement.
Tax Avoidance and General Profits and Losses
The partnership agreement's determination of distributive shares is disregarded where the principal purpose for the allocation is tax evasion or
42
avoidance. 4 1 Code section 704 (b) and the corresponding Regulations apply
this limitation to any allocation in the partnership agreement-whether general profits and losses, specific gains, or specific deductions. Where tax avoidance is found, however, section 704 (b) determines each partner's share in
accordance with the general profit and loss allocation established in the
partnership agreement. This possible inconsistency raises the question of
whether the tax avoidance limitation applies to the general profit and loss
shares established in the partnership agreement. The Senate report, referring
43
to tax avoidance provisions in partnership agreements, states:
[S]uch provisions may be disregarded if the principal purpose is
tax avoidance or evasion. Such items would then be attributed to all the
partners in accordance with the provisions of the partnership agreement for sharing partnership income or losses generally.
This exhibits a congressional indifference to the manner in which partners
share ordinary income, and thus supports the inapplicability of the limitation to the sharing of general profits and losses. Nevertheless, the Code- and
the Senate report4 5 do provide that the tax avoidance test applies to "any"
provision, including provisions as to general profits and losses. Moreover,
the preceding quotation from the Senate report followed an example that
disregarded an allocation of special income rather than one of general profits
and losses. Thus, application of the test to general profits and losses is not
foreclosed.
37. T.D. 4042, VI-2 GuM. BULL. 227 (1927).
38. Hellman v. United States, 44 F.2d 83 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Clement A. Griscom III, P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 46,097 (1946).
39. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 46,097 (1946).
40. Id. at 300.
41.

CODE

§704 (b) (2).

42. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
43. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
44. CODE §704 (b).
45. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
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In Smith v. Commissioner's the court agreed that a modification cannot be
a vehicle to avoid taxation. Subsequently, in Jean V. Kresser47 the Service
offered this general language as support for the applicability of the tax
avoidance limitation to general profits and losses. Although the court did
not reach the issue, a footnote to the Kresser opinion disagreed with the
Service for two reasons. First, the structure of the statute shows a reliance
on the general profit and loss allocation in the partnership agreement.48
Second, the legislative history implied the limitation was inapplicable to
general profits and losses.49
One authority favoring inapplicability concluded that any allocation of
the general profits and losses should be allowed to enable the partners to
reflect their varying interests in the partnership.60 However, there has been
no judicial determination of this issue. The arguments for inapplicability
of the tax avoidance test, nevertheless, seem to outweigh those for applicability. Moreover, even if applicable, it is doubtful that a principal tax avoidance purpose could be demonstrated for general profits and losses.
A Tax Avoidance Purpose
Since case authority is scarce concerning what constitutes tax avoidance
under section 704 (b) (2), a study of the legislative history and the Regulations
is necessary.5 The Senate report 52 states that a provision in a partnership
agreement will be recognized if its allocation has substantial economic effect
and is not merely a device for reducing taxes. Although of little assistance,
this does imply a dual test, which the 1954 proposed Regulations adopted.
This dual test provoked an extensive analysis by the American Law Institute (ALI).53 The ALI doubted that the results of the dual test were intended by Congress, since an allocation could be disallowed because it had
no substantial economic effect, even though not motivated by tax avoidance. 54
Conversely, an allocation could be disallowed because it is motivated by tax
avoidance, even though it does have substantial economic effect. 55 Furthermore, the ALI did not consider either a tax avoidance test or an economic
effect test, independently applied, satisfactory. The former is vague and unpredictable, while the latter is unduly rigid.56 The ALI proposed a single

46. 331 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1964).
47. 54 T.C. 1621, 1631 n.5 (1970).
48.

Id.

49. Id.
J. MERTENS, FEDmAL INcOME TAXATiON §35.29 n.28.4 (1971).
51. The only case on point is discussed in text accompanying notes 91-97 infra.
52. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
53. ALI FED. INCOMe, EsrATE AND GiFT TAx STAT. 184 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956); see
50.

McDonald, Distributive Shares of PartnershipIncome and Loss, N.Y.U. 15TH INSr. ON FED.
TAX 52 (1957).

54. ALI, supra note 53, at 184.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 185.
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bona fide business arrangement test,5 7 its prime consideration being the
5
impact of an allocation upon a partner's income and capital interests. Thus,
substantially offsetting allocations among the partners would not be recognizedA9
The proposed dual test was discarded by the Service, and the final
Regulations adopted a single test of tax avoidance,60 to be determined from
all the surrounding facts and circumstances. The final Regulations also
provide for consideration of six relevant tax avoidance factors.61
Tax Avoidance Factors
Business Purpose. The first factor is whether the partnership or a partner
individually has a business purpose for the allocation provided in the partnership agreement. 62 Absence of such a purpose implies tax avoidance- and
casts considerable doubt as to the true purpose of the allocation,64 but does
not itself disqualify the allocation.65
For example, the provisions of a partnership agreement may allocate to
a resident partner of a foreign country a percentage of the profits from
operations within that country. 6 Although this percentage may exceed his
normal share of general partnership income, such an allocation will be recognized unless other tax avoidance circumstances are present.
Substantial Economic Effect. Substantial economic effect on the partners'
share of income or loss, independently of tax consequences, represents another important consideration.6 7 In applying this test different criteria may be
relevant for income and deduction items.6
The prime consideration for income items is whether the share of income
actually changes. 69 For example, if capital gains are allocated to one partner
in a two-man partnership and an equal amount of ordinary income is allocated to the other partner, there is no substantial economic effect, since
the amount of dollars each receives is the same as if no special allocation had
been made 70

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
61. Id. See text accompanying note 90 infra.
62. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
63. See Driscoll, Tax Problems of Partnerships- Special Allocation of Specific Items,
U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 421, 429 (1958).
64. See Boone, Partnership Taxation: The Allocation of Specific Items of Income and
Loss Under the 1954 Code, 20 Sw. L.J. 840 (1966).
65. Id.
66. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b) (ex. 2) (1956).
67. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
68. J. MERTENS, supra note 50, at 116-17; Driscoll, supra note 63, at 430-31.
69. J. MERTENS, supra note 50, at 116-17; Driscoll, supra note 63, at 430-31.
70. Driscoll, supra note 63, at 429.
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Where deduction items are involved, however, the relationship between
the partner and the deduction item must be considered. 71 Apparently, the
partner receiving the allocation must be the one bearing the expense.72 Thus,
the allocation of a charitable deduction to the particular partner whose capital
account was charged therewith would have economic effect. 73
Since economic effect will be examined in relation to other allocations
and adjustments,74 the test cannot be circumvented by juggling various items.
For example, a partnership may allocate income from operation of a foreign
branch to the foreign partners. However, if it adjusts other items, such
as overhead, to offset such allocations the substantial economic effect test will
75
not be met.
Related Items. The third factor concerns whether related items are subject to the same allocation.7 6 Thus, if tax-exempt interest from municipal
bonds is allocated to one partner, it would be significant whether gain or
77
loss upon sale of the bonds is also allocated to that partner.
Normal Business Risks. Whether normal business factors were recognized
in the allocation will also be considered. 78 Allocations made after the amount
of the allocated item could be reasonably estimated are suspect. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the assumption of normal business risks was involved.79
For example, two partners wait until just before the end of a taxable
year to make a special allocation of tax-exempt interest to one and dividends to the other. The allocation lacks the significance it would have had
if made earlier in the year when the risk of receipts from these sources
existed. 0
This factor may conflict with the liberal time limits allowed for modifying
the partnership agreement.8" The modification requirements, however, pertain
to the existence of the modification, while the tax avoidance test pertains
to the recognition of the allocation.8s Although timing is a relevant factor
in this recognition, it should not be inferred that last-minute allocations will
necessarily be disallowed. 3 A justifiable allocation may be recognized even
though the timing presents unfavorable inferences.

Id. at 430; J. MERTENS, supra note 50, at 116.
72. J. MERTENS, supra note 50, at 116; Driscoll, supra note 63, at 430.
73. Boone, supra note 64, at 846.
71.

74. Id.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Driscoll, supra note 63, at 430.
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
Driscoll, supra note 63, at 431.
Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).

79. Driscoll, supra note 63, at 432.
80.

Id.

81. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra; Driscoll, supra note 63, at 433.
82. Driscoll, supra note 63, at 433.
83. Id.
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Duration. The fifth factor is the duration of the allocation.8 4 If
allocation is made for only one year or the pattern of allocation is
followed consistently from year to year, an inference of tax avoidance
arise.8 5 Valid business reasons for such changes, nevertheless, can support
allocation. s 6

the
not
can
the

Over-all Tax Consequences. An examination of the over-all tax consequences of the allocation is a final inquiry.8 7 The purpose is not to question
an allocation merely because it results in a tax benefit,88 but rather to prevent
some unusual abuse of the allocation privilege not covered by the other
factors. s 9

These six factors are merely illustrative of the surrounding facts and
circumstances evidencing a principal purpose of tax avoidance. Not only
may other factors be pertinent, but also factors designated in the Regulations
may be inapplicable to a particular case. Moreover, the Regulations should
not be considered as imposing a series of requirements for obtaining tax
recognition of an allocation. 90
Application of Tax Avoidance Factors
Applying this legislative and administrative background the Tax Court in
Stanley C. Orrisch9' found a principal purpose of tax avoidance. There, the
partnership's depreciation deductions were allocated to one partner on the
understanding that he would pay the tax on any subsequent gain attributed
to the specially allocated depreciation. The court noted that the allocation
was not subject to business risk, had no business purpose, and was entered
into to mimimize over-all tax consequences.9 2 Since the depreciation deduction
would not vary with the fortunes of the business, the tax effect was known
when the allocation was adopted, and therefore, no business risk existed.
Moreover, the partner receiving the allocation had extensive income to
offset the additional depreciation deduction, while the other partner expected
no taxable income in the near future and was insulated by the agreement from
potential capital gain income upon a future sale. The court concluded that
the inference was unmistakably clear that the allocation did not reflect
normal business considerations but was designed to minimize over-all tax
consequences.

93

84. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
85. Driscoll, supra note 63, at 434.
86.

Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2) (1956).
Driscoll, supra note 63, at 434.
Boone, supra note 64, at 847.
Driscoll, supra note 63, at 435.
55 T.C. 395 (1970).
Id. at 401.
Id.
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The taxpayer primarily argued that the allocation had substantial economic effect, since the allocation was reflected in the capital accounts.0 4 The
court noted, however, that if the property were sold at a gain the taxpayer's
prior deductions would be offset by the agreement's allocation of gain to him.9 5
If sold at a loss, the disparity created in the capital accounts by the allocation
would also be offset constructively, since the partners were to share equally
upon dissolution, notwithstanding their capital accounts.98 Thus, no effect on
the over-all dollar amount of the taxpayer's share would result independently
of tax consequences.
The inference of tax avoidance predominated all the facts and circumstances in Orrisch.97 Although as a general rule allocations having valid business purposes apart from their tax consequences will be recognized, 98 the
facts of each case must be carefully examined in light of the tax avoidance
factors established in the Regulations.
SPECIAL RoLEs OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

To preserve flexibility in partnership taxation, the Code specifically provides for alternative treatment under the partnership agreement with respect
to contributed property, undivided interests, and goodwill payments upon
liquidation. These special roles of the partnership agreement minimize the
uncertainty that can exist when an allocation is based solely on the general
privilege of section 704.
CONTRIBUTED PROPERTY

When a partner contributes property to a partnership, the partnership's
basis for such property is equal to the basis of the contributing partner.99
Under the entity approach of Code section 704 (c) (1) this partnership property is considered purchased by the partnership for an amount equal to its
basis. The relationship of the contributing partner to the property is obliterated. The amount of any subsequent depreciation, depletion, gain, or loss
from such property is shared among the partners in accordance with their
general profit and loss ratios. 100
To illustrate this approach, assume A contributes 100 dollars to the AB
partnership and B contributes land with a basis to B of forty dollars but a

94. Id. at 402.
95. Id. at 403.
96. Id. at 403-04.
97. Id. at 404. But if one partner contributes all the capital, he may be entitled to
an allocation of the entire depreciation deduction. Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-187, 1966-2 GUM. BULL.
246, in which allocation of syndicate tax exempt bond interest to members of the syndicate who advanced the funds to purchase the bonds was approved.
98. Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970); J. MERTENS, supra note 50, at 114; Driscoll,
supra note 63, at 426; see, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.704-I (b) (2) (ex. 1-5) (1956).
99. CoDE §723.
100. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra for discussion of distributive share.
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fair market value of 100 dollars. They agree to share profits and losses equally.
If the partnership subsequently sells the land for 100 dollars, the partnership
gain of sixty dollars will be shared equally, with A and B each being taxed
on his thirty dollar share. 10 1 A is obviously being taxed on gain attributable
to the period of B's ownership, this tax result being inconsistent with the
economic realities. A has realized no economic gain because the value of the
property contributed to the partnership has not increased.
The legislative history reveals that this approach was adopted for purposes of simplification,102 apparently meaning bookkeeping simplicity. This
method was justified because its variance from the theoretically better economic result is mitigated upon disposition of a partner's interest in the
partnership. 103 Assume the AB partnership is terminated immediately after
the land sale and the 200 dollars cash is distributed equally to A and B. Since
A's basis for his partnership interest is 130 dollars, 0 4 his receipt of only 100
dollars gives him a loss equal to the gain upon the land sale.10 5 Additionally,
since B's basis is seventy dollars, 10 his receipt of 100 dollars gives him the
economic gain previously taxed to A.
The Aggregate Approach
Congress, nevertheless, specially provided that the partnership agreement
may adopt the theoretically better economic result 0 7 if the property is contributed to the partnership by a partner'0 8 and the partnership agreement
specifically provides for recognition of the pre-contribution difference between
fair market value and basis. 10 9 If these conditions are met, the entity approach is replaced by the aggregate approach, which maintains the partners'
relationship to the contributed property for the purposes of depreciation, depletion, gain, or loss.
In the prior illustration' ° the aggregate approach would earmark the
sixty dollar appreciation at the time of contribution to partner B. Since the
AB partnership's gain of sixty dollars equalled this pre-contribution appreciation, a sixty dollar allocation to B is obvious. However, suppose the AB

101.

Jackson, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L.

REV.

1183, 1205 (1954).
102. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1954).
103. Id. But cf. Gelband, Allocations of Income and Deductions Among Partners,N.Y.U.
21sT INsT. ON FED. TAx. 997, 1005 (1963), and text accompanying notes 121-124 infra.
104. The $130 figure is derived from A's contribution of $100 plus the $30 of gain
taxed to A.

CODE§

§705,

722.

105. Equal tax consequences would depend on consistent characterization.
106. The $70 figure is derived from the land contributed with a $40 basis plus the
$30 of gain taxed to B. CODE §§705, 722.
107. CODE §704 (c) (2).
108. Id.; Trinkle v. United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9184 (S.D. Cal. 1959); J.
M

TRTNS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

118 (1971).

109. CODE §704 (c) (2). Although such provision may be oral, certainty calls for a
writing. A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §11.04, at 115 (1971).
110. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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partnership sold the land for only ninety dollars. The partnership now has a
gain of only fifty dollars. It is possible that B could just be allocated the full
fifty dollar gain. Alternatively, B could still be allocated the sixty dollar gain
attributable to him before the partnership formation. The ten dollar economic loss in value to the partnership could then be shared equally by
A and B, with A reporting a five dollar loss and B a fifty-five dollar gain.
Both theories are compatible with the aggregate approach, the former being
called the ceiling rule and the latter the credited value rule.," The Regulations,"12 however, require the ceiling rule to be used when the aggregate

approach is adopted in the partnership agreement,"' a requirement justified
by the legislative history."'"
Expansion of the Section 704 (c) (2) Privilege

The Regulations have enlarged the scope of section 704 (c) (2) to allow a
modified aggregate approach in two ways." 5 First, the entire difference between the fair market value and the basis of the contributed property need
not be allocated to the contributing partner. Instead, the difference can be
shared among the partners in any agreed ratio. Second, the aggregate approach can be adopted for selected pieces of contributed property. The entity
approach of the Code would then apply to the unselected property."-6
With this expansion, the section 704 (c) (2) privilege will often not equate
111. Jackson, supra note 101, at 1205-06. The credited value rule treats the contributor
of property as having sold an undivided interest in the contributed property to the other
partners. In return, he receives an undivided interest in the properties contributed by the
others. Any gain or loss is postponed until the property is disposed of by sale or depredation. Thus, in the textual illustration B is treated as having sold half of the land
to A for $50 (half of the fair market value). Since half of B's basis is $20, there is a
$30 gain to B that is postponed until the partnership sells the land. The sale price of
$90 is allocated $45 to A and B, with the result that A has a $5 loss ($45-$50) and B has
a $55 gain (the $80 postponed gain plus $25 gain from the half retained by B with a $20
basis and a $45 sale price).
112. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(c)(2)(i) (1956).
113. The Code is silent on which rule should be utilized.
114. S. Rn,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954). In order to illustrate the entity
and aggregate approaches to the partnership's depreciation deduction, assume B contributes
a depredable asset with a basis of $40 and fair market value of $100. It depreciates at a
rate of 10% annually. A contributes $100 cash. Under the entity approach the $4 deduction (10% of the $40 basis) would be shared equally by A and B. Under the aggregate
approach, if provided for in the partnership agreement, A would be allocated the entire
deduction. Since the economic depredation would be $10 (10% of the $100 fair market
value) and A's equal share would be $5, A receives the entire $4 ceiling deduction allowable to the partnership.
115. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1 (c) (2) (i) (1956).
116. Giving such broad powers to the partners through the Regulations seems justified
only because §704(c) (2) calls for implementation of the aggregate approach privilege
pursuant to the Regulations. Nevertheless, the legislative history and the wording of the
statute appear to contemplate the use of this privilege only with respect to all contributed
property and to all of the pre-contribution gain or loss -not selected items or arbitrary
portions.
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economic realities with tax results."n

Rather, the partners may choose any

position along the spectrum from complete consonance of the tax and
economic results to complete disparity. Thus, partners can seemingly allocate
arbitrary amounts for purely tax reasons without any reference to the economics of the situation.11 s Although at least one commentator has advocated the applicability of the section 704 (b) (2) tax avoidance limitation to
this section 704 (c) (2) privilege, 19 most authorities 20 have concluded that
this tax avoidance provision is a separate and distinct part of the statute and
does not apply to section 704 (c) (2).
Criticism of the Section 704 (c) (1) Entity Approach
The partners must specifically include a special allocation provision in
the partnership agreement in order to avoid the disparity between tax and
economic results, which will occur under the section 704 (c) (1) entity approach.' 21 Failure to include such a provision automatically precludes use of
the aggregate approach. 22 This "elective" element has been strongly criticized on the basis that consonance between economic and tax results is a
higher consideration than bookkeeping simplicity. 12 3 Moreover, this "elective" requirement is sharply attacked as presupposing that partners will know
of the aggregate approach alternative.12 The recommendation that the aggregate approach be the required method in the Code, and the entity approach elective, has not been accepted.
UNDIVIDED INTERESTS

Where prospective partners are owners of undivided interests in property
to be contributed to a partnership, the Code's required allocation method will
usually be undesirable.
Under section 704 (c) (3), when partners contribute their undivided interests in property to a partnership and such interests are the same after the
contribution as before, depreciation, depletion, gain, or loss will be deter117. This presents a further question as to the propriety of applying §704 (c) (2) to
pre-admission, unrealized gains and losses upon the admission of a new partner. Compare
McDonald, The Impact of the PartnershipAgreement on Taxation Under Subchapter K,
16 TUL. TAX INsT. 354, 367 (1966) (inapplicable, since the admission situation is not

specifically provided for in the Code), with J. MERTENS, supra note 108, at 123 (applicable,
since admission creates a new partnership to which the previous partners are contributing
property of the old partnership).

118. Gelband, supra note 103, at 1008.
119. Id.
120. J. MERTENS, supra note 108, at 121; A. WILLIS, supra note 109, at 116; Boone,
Partnership Taxation: The Allocation of Specific Items of Income and Loss Under the
1954 Code, 20 Sw. L.J. 840, 854 (1966); McDonald, supra note 117, at 366.
121. See text accompanying notes 107-109 supra for conditions to the use of the aggregate approach.
122.

CODE §704 (c) (2).

123. Gelband, supra note 103, at 1004.
124. id.
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mined as if such interests had not been contributed. For example, assume A
and B jointly own land worth 200 dollars and that A's basis for his half
interest is 100 dollars and B's is forty dollars. A and B decide to form a
partnership. They accordingly contribute their undivided interests in the
property to the partnership and agree to have equal capital and profit and
loss ratios.125 If the land is sold for 200 dollars, section 704(c) (3) would
allocate the sixty dollar gain 126 entirely to B. This rule treats them as if no
partnership existed and A and B were joint owners. Thus, A receives half
of the 200 dollars for his half interest, or 100 dollars, and because his basis
is 100 dollars, he has no gain. B receives the other 100 dollars, and since his
basis is forty dollars, he has a sixty dollar gain.
Although the partners may have intended to share this gain equally, this
result is required by the Code unless the partners specifically provide otherwise in the partnership agreement. 127 This provision may adopt the entity approach for simplification or the aggregate approach to reflect economic
28
reality.1
Justification
The required rule was designed primarily for the situation in which persons holding undivided interests in property are taxed as if they were a
partnership, even though they never intended to become partners.129 The
rule reduces any harshness resulting from partnership status and also recognizes the individual's preference for taxation according to their individual
bases in the property. In the absence of this rule, such persons would be taxed
as a partnership under the section 704 (c) (1) entity approach,130 which disregards individual bases in the property and divides the partnership gain
equally. It is doubtful that joint owners forced into taxation as a partnership would desire this result.
Requirements for Section 704 (c) (3) Applicability
For section 704 (c) (3) to apply, the interests of the owners in both capital
and profits must be the same after the contribution as before.' 3' Prospective
partners should not purposely fail to fulfill this requirement to gain taxation

125. Jackson, supra note 101, at 1209.
126. The partnership would take a $140 transferred basis, representing the individual
basis of each contributing partner. CODE §723.
127. CODE §704 (c) (3).
128. Of course, the ceiling rule of the aggregate approach would apply. Gelband, supra
note 103, at 1007. Once again, the tax avoidance limitation is probably inapplicable. For a
full discussion of these two approaches, see text accompanying notes 99-114 supra.
129. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess. 379 (1954); see note 1 supra for the broad
meaning of partnership in federal income taxation.

130. Since the joint owners never considered themselves partners, they would not have
any specific provision adopting the aggregate approach.
131. CODE §704 (c) (3).
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under the entity approach. If the entity approach is desired, the risk of
meeting the requirement can be avoided by specifically providing for the
entity approach in the partnership agreement. This follows regardless of
the fact that little uncertainty will exist as to whether the condition has been
met.
To illustrate the mechanics of this requirement, assume A and B contribute their respective undivided interests in property to a partnership in
which each has an equal interest in capital and profits. A has a 4,000 dollar
basis for his half interest in the property, and B a 10,000 dollar basis. Subsequently, A contributes 5,000 dollars cash to his share of partnership capital.
As a result of A's additional contribution, A has a greater interest in the
partnership capital. Therefore, the interests of the partners in the partnership
132
capital no longer correspond to their undivided interests in the property.
Consequently, the entity approach would apply. It would likewise apply, if
at the time of the contribution by A and B, a third partner C contributed
cash and became an equal partner.

1 33

Despite the probable certainty resulting from applying the mechanics of
this requirement, nearly absolute certainty can be achieved by including a
specific provision in the partnership agreement. Furthermore, such a provision provides better evidence of the partners' intentions to be taxed under
the entity approach.
GOODWILL PAYMENTS UPON LIQUIDATION

The partnership agreement is also essential to the establishment of goodwill upon liquidation. Recognizing the difficulty in valuing goodwill,13 4 section 736 of the Code refuses to treat liquidating payments to a partner in excess of his capital interest as payments for goodwill. 13 5 If the amount of the
excess payments is established without regard to the future income of the
3
partnership, the partner receives ordinary income 6 and the partnership is
37
If the amount varies with the income of the
allowed an ordinary deduction.
partnership, however, the partner receives income characterized as if he were
still sharing partnership profits, 38 and the partnership is not allowed a deduc-

132.

Treas. Reg.

§1.704-1(c)(3)(ii)

(ex. 1)

(1956).

Similarly, a

distribution

of cash

would have the same effect. But loans and earnings withdrawn in anticipation of a share
of the profits (drawings) would not have such effect, since they are not distributions of
capital. Id.
133. Jackson, supra note 101, at 1209.
134. See J. MERTENS, supra note 108, at 271, cited in Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d
16 (10th Cir. 1962).
135. CODE §736(b). If the goodwill were purchased, such basis for the goodwill constitutes part of the capital interest of the partner and only payments for goodwill in
excess of this basis are treated as goodwill payments.
136. CODE §§707(c), 736(a).
137. Id.
138. CODE §§702, 736(a). An agreement to receive a percentage of the profits for a
number of years clearly yields an amount varying with partnership income.
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tion.'3 Therefore, the liquidated partner will, in many instances, receive
ordinary income to the extent of the excess payments.
To avoid the inequities that might result from this complete disregard
of the capital asset nature of goodwill,14 0 the partners are permitted to
recognize liquidating payments as for goodwill- if they have specifically
provided for goodwill payments in the partnership agreement. 1 2 Such goodwill is then treated as part of the capital interest of the partner, the liquidation of which results in capital gain.1 4 3 Since these payments for goodwill are
a part of the partnership capital interest, they cannot be deducted by the
partnership.l"
ValuationBurden
Providing for goodwill in the partnership agreement also presents the
later difficulties in valuation. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that
the interests of the continuing partners and the withdrawing partner often
conflict. The continuing partners desire a low valuation so that a larger
portion of the total liquidating payment will be considered as an excess payment and deductible by the partnership. The withdrawing partner, however,
desires a high valuation so that more of his total liquidating payment is for
goodwill and taxed as capital gain.
Due to this conflict, an arm's-length valuation usually results from the
partners' bargaining. Although this valuation is usually upheld,145 it nevertheless cannot exceed a reasonable value for the partner's share of goodwill.140
Strict Interpretation
This flexible treatment of goodwill is one of the principal tax factors to
be considered when drafting a partnership agreement.147 A specific provision
must be included to cover payments for goodwill.148 This requirement is
139. Id.

140. J. MERTmNs, supra note 108, at 271, cited in Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d
16 (10th Cir. 1962).
141. CODE §736 (b) (2) (B).
142. Id. Recall that the partnership agreement includes modifications made up to the
filing date for the tax return. Goodwill may be provided for by such means if not considered at the time of liquidation. It is doubtful, however, that the remaining partners
could act adversely to the interest of the withdrawing partner after he had left the
partnership. J. MERaTNS, supra note 108, at 272, cited in Commissioner v. Jackson Inv. Co.,
346 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1965); see note 152 infra.
143. CODE §736 (b).
144. See Commissioner v. Jackson Inv. Co., 346 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1965); J.
.AMmTiNs,
supra note 108, at 271.
145. Treas. Reg. §1.786-1 (b) (3) (1956). See Commissioner v. Jackson Inv. Co., 346 F.2d
187 (9th Cir. 1965).
146. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 395 (1954); Treas. Reg. §1.736-1 (b) (3) (1956);
J. MEETENs, supra note 108, at 271.

147. J. MuLTEms, supra note 108, at 272.
148. CODE §736 (b) (2) (B).
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strictly interpreted, as evidenced by Smith v. Commissioner,149 where an
intent to compensate for goodwill was not permitted to be drawn from the
surrounding circumstances. 150 Since the partnership agreement did not specifically provide for goodwill payments the court felt that if intent could be
determined by other means uncertainty and confusion would cloud the
issue, nullifying efforts of Congress to clarify a complex situation.'". Thus,
the partnership agreement provision must specifically refer to goodwill,15 2
since a sufficiently clear purpose to provide for goodwill payments is insufficient.
OTHER DETERMINATIONS THROUGH AN AGREEMENT

Sale or Liquidation
A problem closely related to that of liquidating payments for goodwill is
determining whether a liquidation has in fact occurred or whether a sale
has been made to the withdrawing partner. Although the practical differences
between the two are minimal in terms of ultimate economic effect, 153 the
determination is important, since an enormous disparity in the tax burden
exists between the two.154
If a sale occurs, the withdrawing partner receives capital gain or loss,155
and the continuing partners do not receive a deduction for the payments. 156
If a liquidation occurs, however, the withdrawing partner receives more
ordinary income than under a sale, and the continuing partners can deduct
57
part of the payments.
Since the interests of the partners will obviously conflict, a partnership
agreement provision should adjust their interests by specifically determining
whether a sale or liquidation occurs. Such an arm's-length determination has
generally been accepted by the courts, since the intent of the partners
determines whether a sale or liquidation occurs' 58 and the legal agreement

149. 313 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1962).
150. Id.
151.

Id. These efforts were designed so that partners would provide for their con-

flicting interests in advance.
152. See also Commissioner v. Jackson Inv. Co., 346 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding
ambiguous language in partnership agreement classifying liquidating payments both as

for goodwill and as for mere excess payments meets the specific reference requirement of
§736 (b) (2) (B)).
153. See Miller v. United States, 331 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1964); David A. Foxman, 41 T.C.
535, 550 (1964), afl'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965); Paul J. Kelly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
70,250 (1970).
154. Compare CODE §741, with CODE §736; see cases cited note 153 supra.
155. Some ordinary income will result where "unrealized receivables" or "substantially
appreciated inventory" exist. See CODE §751.
156. See David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 549 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
157. Id.; CODE §736 (a).
158. E.g., Bolling v. Patterson, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1464 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
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is the strongest and primary expression of such intent.159 Moreover, the surrounding circumstances should be considered only if the agreement is ambiguous. 160 Thus, the form of the transaction is determinative of the tax
consequences.26
FactorsEvidencingIntent
The expression of the partners' intent, however, must reveal whether the
transaction is a sale or a liquidation and not just whether the payments are
intended as deductible.162 Since deductibility depends upon the characterization of the transaction, partners' statements as to deductibility are ineffective unless they are consistent with the type of transaction determined
to exist.
Various factors are used to determine if a transaction is a sale or a
liquidation. Obviously the presence or absence of the word "sale" in the
agreement itself' 63 or language that reasonably supports a finding of a sale
are factors to be considered. However, one court has held that the absence of
both of these factors required a determination that the transaction was not
a sale.6 4 This conclusion is unfortunate, since the intent of the parties
should control; the agreement is only strong evidence of such intent. Moreover, there are other factors to be considered that might be embodied in
the agreement.
Whether the agreement places liability for the termination payments
upon the partnership or the partners individually should also be examined.
If the agreement places liability on the partnership a liquidation is implied, since the partnership is returning capital to the withdrawing partner. 165
If, however, the other partners are liable under the agreement, a sale is implied since the ownership of capital is merely being rearranged among the
partners.' 6 Such implications from the agreement should also be supported
16
in actuality. 7
In Paul J. Kelly"" the fact that payments were actually drawn on partnership checks overcame the implication of a sale created by the agreement. This
implication of a sale existed, since the partnership was not a party to the
agreement and the partners signed in their individual capacities.169

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Paul J. Kelly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70,250 (1970).
Miller v. United States, 331 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
Id.; Andrew 0. Stilwell, 46 T.C. 247 (1966); Paul J. Kelly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.

70,250 (1970).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Miller v. United States, 331 F.2d 854 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
Id.; Paul J. Kelly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70,250 (1970).
David A. Foxman, 41 T.C. 535, 552 (1964), affd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
Paul J. Kelly, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 70,250 (1970).
Id.
Id.
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However, the decision in Kelly was influenced by the absence of sale
language within the agreement. Thus, in David A. Foxman"70 payment by
partnership check did not alter a finding of a sale, since the agreement used
words of sale and placed individual liability on the partners.
Furthermore, evidence in Foxman of promissory notes given to the withdrawing partner and signed on behalf of the partnership did not overcome the
sale terms of the agreement.171 The court considered the notes security for
the primary liability of the individual partners. 7 2 Had clear sale language
been absent from the agreement, the notes may have been more influential.
Another important factor is the ownership of property used to discharge
the obligation. 73 A partnership asset would evidence a liquidation, while
4
non-partnership assets would support a sale.1
All these factors merely evidence the intent of the partners. 7 5 A clear
expression of that intent in the agreement will control and, as shown in
Foxman, will overcome other evidentiary factors.
GuaranteedPayments
A clear expression of purpose is equally important in determining the
deductibility of salary or other guaranteed payments to partners under section 707 of the Code. Since partners are normally not entitled to compensation," 6 such payments will be recognized only if the amount is determined
without regard to the income of the partnership. 7 7 Otherwise, the payment
resembles a distributive share of the profits rather than compensation. Thus,
when a partner assumes the status of an employee, he receives ordinary income to the extent of the guaranteed payments, and the partnership receives
an ordinary deduction' 78
Establishment of Status
The partnership agreement can establish that the payments are determined
without regard to the income of the partnership, 79 and such use of the

170. 41 T.C. 535, 552-53 (1964), afl'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
171. Id. at 553.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 552.
174. Id.
175. See text accompanying notes 158-161 supra.
176. Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), afl'd, 329 F.2d 717 (2d
Cir. 1964).
177. CODE §707 (c).
178. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 386 (1954); J. MRamNs, FEDERAL. INCOME
TAXATION 94 (1971). This ordinary income of the partner, however, is not recognized in
the year of receipt but rather at the partnership's year end as a distributive share.
CODE §706

(a).

179. E.g., Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291
717 (2d Cir. 1964); F. A. Falconer, 40 T.C. 1011 (1963).
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partnership agreement is often determinative in establishing guaranteed payments. F. A. Falconer8 0 evinces the difficulty of overcoming a guaranteed
payments provision in a partnership agreement. The taxpayer claimed that
the payments were a loan and presented a promissory note as evidence of
the debt. This evidence was unpersuasive in view of a precise provision for
a guaranteed payment in the partnership agreement.' 8'
Lack of a precise provision, on the other hand, strongly evidences that no
such payments were intended. In Foster v. United States8 2 payments to a
partner were not recognized as guaranteed payments because the agreement
failed to include such a provision. Despite the partnership's designation of
the payments as compensation, the court decided that such payments were
83
in reality anticipated profits.'
CONCLUSION

Through express provisions in their partnership agreement, the partners
themselves can determine the tax consequences of the partnership operation.
Such provisions are virtually mandatory in order to obtain economically
realistic tax results. Moreover, advance resolution of conflicting taxation interests among the partners is highly desirable; and the partnership agreement
is the most appropriate instrument to accomplish this purpose.
The partnership agreement can be directly influential and often determinative of tax consequences from partnership profit and loss allocations,
property contributions, liquidating payments for goodwill, sale or liquidation
characterizations, and guaranteed payments. A decision as to each should be
embodied in a written agreement at the time a partnership is formed or
modified.
AUGUST M. VAN EEPOEL

180. 40 T.C. 1011, 1014-15 (1963).
181. Id.
182. 221 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1964).
183. Id. at 294.
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